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Territorial attachment in the age of globalization – the case 
of Western Europe 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The age of globalization has often been associated with de-/re-territorialisation 
processes. The increasing integration of markets and the appearance of new modes of 
economic production and capital accumulation, on the one hand, and the transfor-
mation of forms of political governance, on the other hand, have both led to the emer-
gence of new territorial actors at the supra-national and sub-national scales. While 
these economic and political de-/re-territorialisation processes have been studied at 
length, relatively little attention has been paid to the transformation of the territorial 
identities associated with these spaces. The aim of the present study is twofold. First, 
it aims to understand whether territorial identities are experiencing a similar re-scaling 
along with modes of economic production and forms of political governance. Second, 
it explores which factors today explain the attachment of people to their territories. A 
descriptive analysis of Eurobarometer survey data for Western Europe reveals no 
signs of a re-scaling of territorial identities, pointing to a sort of inertia of these identi-
ties in relation to the changing of political and economic structures. A statistical mod-
el on four scales of territorial attachment (local, regional, national, and European) 
shows the complexity of its formation, as both personal compositional and regional 
contextual factors should be taken into account. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between territory and collective identity in the age of globaliza-
tion is a complex one. Since the early 1990s, a growing literature has questioned the 
persistence of the nation-state as an effective economic and territorial unit for ensur-
ing the welfare of its inhabitants (O'Brien, 1992; Ohmae, 1993; Badie, 1995; Guéhen-
no, 1995). The accelerated circulation of people, commodities, capital, information, 
and images has supposedly undermined the role and power of the nation-state (Jessop, 
1993; Amin and Thrift, 1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1995; Swyngedouw, 1997; Keat-
ing, 1998; Brenner, 1999; Castells, 2000; Jones, 2001; Le Galès, 2002). At the same 
time, newly empowered territorial units (cities, regions, and supra-national institu-
tions) have emerged as significant actors in the functioning of the global economy, 
questioning, directly or indirectly, the role of the nation-state as the sole container of 
territorial identities (Taylor, 2000; Sassen, 2006; Paasi, 2009; Keating, 2009).  
This process of re-scaling, defined here as the shifting of a variety of processes 
away from their traditional level of aggregation, has largely been studied in terms of 
the transformation of modes of economic production and forms of political govern-
ance. Yet, whether this process of re-scaling also influences the ways people express 
their collective identities is something which has only partially been investigated 
(Mlinar, 1992; Scholte, 1996; Yaeger, 1996; Castells, 1997; Agnew, 1999; Berezin 
and Schain, 2003; Croucher, 2004; Savage et al., 2004; Fitjar, 2010). In other words, 
is the re-scaling of political and economic processes accompanied by a similar re-
scaling of territorial identities?  
The purpose of this article is to offer a quantitative analysis of territorial identi-
ties in the present globalized era, focusing both on the question above and on the fac-
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tors which today explain territorial identities. Operatively, the study analyzes Euroba-
rometer survey data for territorial attachment covering the original fifteen member-
states of the European Union (EU-15)—a geographical area which encompasses al-
most all of Western Europe. The explicit assumption we make is that, at least in quan-
titative terms, territorial attachment can be used as a proxy to study territorial identi-
ties. Although this operationalization is unavoidable, as Eurobarometer does not have 
a question about ‘identity’ per se, we would argue that attachment and identity are 
often viewed in the literature as closely related or used interchangeably (Low and 
Altman 1992; Williams et al. 1992; Twigger-Ross and Uzzell 1996; Lewicka 2008). 
Moreover, looking at the praxis adopted in other survey studies concerned with terri-
torial identities, these latter are also operationalized in alternative terms – for instance 
as ‘belonging’ (European Values Study) or as a feeling of ‘closeness’ (International 
Social Survey Programme). 
The article is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the literature on the 
interaction between place and identity, as theorized by scholars working in humanistic 
geography and environmental psychology, which in turn serves as the basis for inter-
preting the formation and consolidation of territorial attachments.  In section two, we 
examine the series of Eurobarometer survey data (1991-2007) for territorial attach-
ment at four scales (local, regional, national and European), to answer the ‘re-scaling’ 
question. The third part analyzes statistically the same four scales in order to under-
stand the predictors of territorial attachment, testing the significance of a set of con-
trols and geographically defined contextual variables included in the statistical model. 
A concluding section summarizes the key findings and briefly suggests avenues for 
further work on the topic.  
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2. Geography, place and the making of territorial attachment 
In her voluminous study of the imbrications of territory, authority and rights, 
Sassen (2006) points to the link between territorial identities, political institutions and 
economic modes of production. Since its emergence in the 18h century, as a technical 
device of the European monarchical states to standardize, homogenize and disci-
plinize social and material reality (Alliès, 1980), territory has been theorized in close 
connection with the ‘political’ and the ‘cultural’ – a perspective which continues to 
inform scholarly attempts to investigate the restructuring of contemporary territoriali-
ties (Ansell and Di Palma, 2004; Antonsich, 2009). 
Departing from these theoretical premises, it is legitimate to analyze whether the 
re-scaling associated with the shift from a Fordist economy, based on mass production 
and consumption organized at the national scale, to the present post-Fordist economy, 
characterized by local flexible production working within an inter-dependent market 
organized at the global scale (Jessop, 1994), is also associated with a shift in territorial 
attachment and identity. To be sure, the ‘re-scaling’ of modes of economic production 
is not just a new name to capture an old phenomenon. The de-nationalization process 
experienced by present economies is not only a historical shift in the forms of capital 
(re)production and accumulation (Brenner, 1999), but also a feature of contemporary 
forms of political governance, with new actors claiming spaces of political action 
which once belonged exclusively to the state (Keating, 1998; Le Galès, 2002). 
Numerous scholars, working in both geography and environmental psychology 
(see, for example, Antonsich, 2010a and Hidalgo and Hernandez, 2001 respectively), 
have used ‘place attachment,’ or the related ‘sense of place,’ as key organizing con-
cepts to understand how individuals relate to a given geographical space. While the 
strength of an ‘affective bond’ between people and places is widely agreed upon—the 
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significance of a particular place is determined by a human’s ability to ascribe mean-
ing to that place (Tuan, 1976)—place itself remains an abstract concept. 
Agnew’s (1989: 9) proposal for a ‘concept of place in which spatially extensive 
fields of economic and political power are mediated through historically defined con-
junctures of social interaction specific to localities’ moves towards a more grounded 
conceptualization. Taking this idea further, Agnew (1987; 1996) emphasises the no-
tion of geographic context in order to investigate how geographic location and locale 
potentially influence political opinion and collective perceptions. Though we do not 
equate place and territory, the latter, defined here as a ‘politico-institutional bounded 
space’ (Antonsich 2009: 789), is an environment—like place—that influences a varie-
ty of individual and collective opinions. In turn, if territory is understood, following 
Elden (2010: 811), as ‘a political technology,’ it might also become something that 
the individuals sited within it identify with and are attached to. As a ‘political tech-
nology,’ territory can indeed supplement an emotional connection through the provi-
sion of services (i.e. education) or by operating as economic containers for growth 
(Taylor, 1994), among other examples. While the ‘territorial’ has an historical basis, 
we are interested here in contemporary manifestations of attachment to territory in 
some of its actual forms: the local, the regional, the national, and the European. Terri-
tories, therefore, at different scales, can be both the contexts which shape people’s 
feeling of attachment and the source of attachment itself.   
Unlike the related concept of place attachment, territorial attachment has been 
both under-theorised and infrequently subjected to empirical analysis (see Marks, 
1999 for an exception). In part, the present article is a first attempt at addressing these 
shortcomings in the wider literature. Identity is not absolute, and individuals can sim-
ultaneously maintain loyalties and attachments to different territorial aggregates (Herb 
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and Kaplan, 1999). As also observed by Marks (1999: 87), individuals may indeed 
have mutually inclusive territorial identities. Marks, against whose empirical work we 
partly position our analysis, leaves a set of important points unaddressed: how identi-
ties are mobilized in different locales, and the alternative characteristics that affect 
territorial attachment among individuals. Before moving to these questions, we first 
want to analyze the relevance of territorial identities and, more specifically, under-
stand whether in a context of increased globalization processes territorial identities 
have somewhat experienced any type of re-scaling. Our attempt to understand what 
motivates territorial attachment considers both individual characteristics and contex-
tual variables variously affected by territorialized space.   
 
3. The empirics of territorial attachment 
Our choice to focus on Western Europe has both theoretical and practical justifi-
cations. Theoretically, because of the high exposure to globalization processes (i.e., 
the internationalization of markets, the international mobility of people and goods, 
technological innovation, communication flows, etc.), this region is a relevant case 
study to test the hypothesis of the ‘re-scaling’ of territorial identity in the post-Fordist 
era. Practically, the Eurobarometer Standard Survey lacks an adequate time series on 
territorial attachment for Europe as a whole.1 
The present study focuses on Eurobarometer data collected in response to the 
following question: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or 
village, to their region, to their country, or to Europe. Please tell me how attached 
you feel to...?”. Respondents answered the question on the basis of a four-point Lik-
ert-type scale: “very attached;” “fairly attached;” “not very attached;” and “not at all 
attached.” This question has been asked periodically since 1991, though a slightly dif-
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ferent wording has been used in some rounds.2 Figure 1 shows the cumulative trend 
(“very attached” + “fairly attached”) for the four levels of territorial attachment, ag-
gregated across the EU-15 states.3 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE  
 
Apart from European attachment, which displays an inconsistent pattern across 
surveys, the other three forms of attachment have been generally stable for the last 
two decades. This suggests that the re-scaling of the political and economic functions 
of the nation-state has not been accompanied by a similar rescaling of territorial iden-
tities as measured in terms of territorial attachment. This finding somewhat challenges 
the widespread assumption that globalization is associated, among others, with an in-
crease of local or regional identities. 
Overall, but not by a large margin, the national remains the principal form of 
identification for respondents. In 2007, 91% of respondents affirmed to be either 
“very” (55%) or “fairly” (36%) attached to their own country. This result is consistent 
with the findings of the 1991 survey, when 90% of respondents answered that they 
were “very” (58%) or “fairly” (32%) attached to their own nation. One can therefore 
infer that either national identity, as operationalized through attachment, is not affect-
ed by the changing politico-economic conditions associated with globalization and the 
post-Fordist economy, or such identification is inelastic, with the logic of social iden-
tification responding only gradually to changes in political-economic structures 
(Poche, 1992). 
Similar considerations apply to local and regional attachments. Interestingly, the 
two overlap across surveys, thus suggesting that people might tend to look at their lo-
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cality and their region in similar ways—a finding also confirmed by a recent qualita-
tive study (Antonsich, 2010b). In the case of European attachment, variation across 
surveys is clear. Apart from a major downturn registered in 2002—the year the Euro 
entered circulation—attachment to Europe is increasing. In 2007, 67% of people in-
terviewed responded that they were either “very” (22%) or “fairly” (45%) attached to 
Europe—an increase of 19% compared to the 1991 survey, when overall 48% of re-
spondents declared to be either “very” (12%) or “fairly” (36%) attached. To some ex-
tent, these figures support the argument that a sense of Europeanness can be generated 
a posteriori by the process of European integration itself, rather than being a neces-
sary, pre-existing condition for integration (Kohli 2000, Gabel 1998a). Whether such 
a feeling, though, can endure periods of serious stress, like the ones associated with 
the Union’s eastern enlargement (in 2004 and 2007) or the present ‘Euro crisis’, is an 
issue which cannot be addressed within the space limitation of this article.  
Here we would like instead to highlight the positive correlation among territorial 
identities. Table 1 shows correlation coefficients (Kendall tau-b) for local, regional, 
national, and European attachment for individual respondents using two Eurobarome-
ter data sets, fielded respectively in 1995 (EB 43.1bis) and in 2007 (EB 67.1) (see Ta-
ble 1).4 
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
Territorial identities at different scales are positively correlated for individuals—
something which has been suggested in previous studies (Duchesne and Frognier, 
1995; Marks, 1999; Opp, 2005).5 Attachment is not mutually exclusive, though corre-
lation is stronger across “neighbouring” scales—the local and regional being more 
correlated than the local and national, for example. The table also shows longitudinal 
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change, as the tau coefficients increase from 1995 to 2007 for all comparisons. This 
suggests that territorial attachment is blended to a greater extent than in the mid-
1990s. Respondents in 2007 were more likely to feel simultaneously attached to the 
regional and European scales. In other words, territorial identities tend to be more 
closely knitted today than fifteen years ago; in the age of globalization, the relation-
ship between forms of territorial identity has strengthened. 
One important caveat applies to the present analysis—could the territorial re-
scaling have taken place before 1991? Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 118), for instance, 
talk of a revival of regionalist movements already back in the 1960s-1970s. In order 
to address this potential issue we considered a different data set, the European Values 
Study, which since 1981 has periodically asked, among others, the two following 
questions: “To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first 
of all? Locality or town where you live; Region or country where you live; Your 
country as a whole; [Continent]; The world as a whole”; “And next? [same options]”. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows the longitudinal cumulative (first and second choices) levels of 
geographical belonging, aggregated across six Western European countries.6 The ab-
solute values for each geographical units offer somewhat a different picture from the 
one observed in the EB surveys. This can be due, among others, to the limited number 
of countries and/or to the different geographical units included in the EVS survey. 
Here, though, we are not concerned with a comparison of the two surveys, but with 
the time under investigation. Apart from the years 1999-2000, when regional and 
country belongings experienced a remarkable change (a change which, surprisingly, 
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goes in the opposite direction from the one detected in the EB surveys for the same 
years), Figure 2 does not reveal any re-scaling of territorial identities even for the 
longer period under consideration – 1981-2008. Available survey data do not allow 
for an earlier analysis.7 Yet, even if an increase of regional identities happened in the 
1960s-1970s, it would be unlikely to be caused by globalization processes as defined 
above, since these processes had not yet fully manifested in those years.  
 
 
4. The determinants of territorial attachment 
The above results are interesting, if somewhat expected. Despite the re-scaling 
of modes of economic production and forms of political governance, respondents in 
the Eurobarometer surveys indicate stable levels of high attachment to traditional ‘so-
cio-spatial containers’: the local, regional, and national. This review provides little 
insight, however, into the determinants of such territorial attachment, a shortfall that 
leaves a range of questions unanswered. In order to explore what factors account for 
attachment across the four territorial scales, we have merged a specific Eurobarometer 
data set (EB 60.1, 2003) with Eurostat data concerning the socio-demographic fea-
tures of the regions where individuals were surveyed.8 This multi-level approach was 
employed to evaluate the relevance of both individual characteristics and geographical 
context in influencing strength of territorial attachment. Since very few studies 
(Marks, 1999; Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001; Opp, 2005) have so far investigat-
ed territorial identities at multiple scales, our analysis is largely explorative.  
The inclusion of the Eurostat variables was motivated by theoretical considera-
tions, but had to be positioned against restrictions resulting from the limited amount 
of data available. Given the theoretical interests of the paper—the impact of globali-
zation on territorial identity and attachment—we incorporated variables that ad-
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dressed the economic structure of the region, its welfare, its economic performance, 
its rural/urban character, and the levels of unemployment of the region’s inhabitants. 
The implicit rationale driving this selection was the assumption that economic factors 
are usually significant in explaining social attitudes. Practically, however, Eurostat 
data presented some limitations in terms of both time and geographical coverage. 
Reaching a compromise between theory and practicality, the following contextual in-
dicators were chosen: GDP per capita (in Purchasing Power Parity); GDP growth; un-
employment rate; employment in technology and knowledge-intensive sectors; and 
population density.  The contextual   variables—all measured at NUTS 2 level9—are 
defined as follows: 
- GDP per capita (PPP): Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market pric-
es measured in Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) per inhabitant. 
- GDP growth: real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices measured as a 
percent change on previous year. 
- Unemployment rate: unemployed persons as a percent of the total workforce. 
- Employment in high-tech sectors: employed persons in technology and 
knowledge-intensive sectors as a percent of total employment. This variable aims to 
capture the degree of exposure of the region to the global economy. 
- Population density: defined as inhabitants per square kilometre, population 
density is an indicator which aims to capture the urban/rural character of the regions 
under scrutiny. 
In order to take into consideration the variance of these indicators over time, the 
mean values for the years 2001-2003 were used instead of the 2003 data—with the 
exception of data for population density; for a number of regions, data was not availa-
ble for the year 2001.10 By averaging the data longitudinally, we addressed the theo-
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retical concern (see, for example, Tunstall et al., 2000) that people’s behaviour is de-
pendent more on the perception of a change (e.g., the perception that this year my in-
come has decreased in relation to last year) than on their actual living condition (e.g., 
how much money I have right now). 
These regional-scale variables were complemented by demographic and compo-
sitional controls drawn from the Eurobarometer dataset, including: 
- Geo-demographic categories: gender, age, education, employment status and 
the geographic character of a respondent’s place of residence—rural, small, or large 
town (coded continuously). 
- Personal values and attitudes of the respondents: personal expectation 
about one’s life (coded continuously, with 1=worse, 2=same and 3=better); near-term 
expectation about the economic situation of the country of residence (coded in the 
same order as personal expectation); importance of family in day-to-day life (coded as 
a dummy variable, with 1=important); willingness to learn a foreign language 
(1=willing, 0=not willing); national pride (coded as a dummy variable, with 1=fairly 
or very proud); European pride (coded in the same fashion as national pride); political 
preference (categorized continuously as right, centre, and left); and political interest 
(how often a respondents speaks with her/his friends about politics; continuously cod-
ed from 1=never to 3=frequently). 
The justification for including this last set of controls was based on prior statisti-
cal studies on European attachment and identity. This work has found that oftentimes 
individuals’ answers are dependent more on subjective perceptions about reality than 
on objective economic indicators (Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Carey, 2002). Moreover, 
following the work by Inglehart (1970; 1977) on the importance of cognitive mobili-
zation for explaining support for the EU, we included a variable that measures the de-
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gree to which an individual discusses political issues in a non-professional setting (see 
also Carey, 2002).11 
 
Modelling 
In the analysis, structuring the dependent variable was complicated by the fact 
that responses for territorial attachment were collected on a four-point Likert-type 
scale, as introduced above. We initially ran an ordinal regression; this is an appropri-
ate model choice when the data are clearly ordered. However, the critical assumption 
of this model, that the effect of the independent variables is the same for each level of 
the dependent variable, was violated. In fact, the “test of parallel lines” turned out to 
be significant for any link function used (probit, logit, or complementary log-log). 
Therefore, the dependent variable was recoded as a binomial variable 
(1=‘very’+‘fairly attached’; 0=‘not very’+‘not at all attached’) and we ran a binary 
logistic regression. 
Logistic regression is used to estimate the odds of a certain event, more precise-
ly defined as the probability an event occurs divided by the probability of the corre-
sponding non-event, when the dependent variable is coded binomially. Moreover, lo-
gistic regression does not require that the dependent variable be normally distributed; 
untransformed, territorial attachment at the local, regional and national scale is not 
normally distributed. There are some drawbacks to this model; dichotomizing an or-
dinal variable results in a loss of information, which can only slightly be compensated 
by the fact that the new statistical model offers an easier way to interpret the coeffi-
cients (Pampel, 2000). A clearer understanding of what motivates attachment to the 
four scales under consideration is the central aim of this paper; this is made easier 
through the transformation of the dependent variable into a binary measure. There-
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fore, we view the compromise between coefficient interpretation and loss of explana-
tory power as acceptable.   
Since answers for territorial attachment were collected separately for the local, 
regional, national and European, four models were generated, one for each scale of 
attachment. The analysis included two steps. For each of the four scales, we first 
evaluated each of the variables separately. After each of the variables selected was 
considered, we then ran the fully specified model. The results of this modelling are 
provided in Appendix 1. A number of interesting patterns emerge from the models 
that we discuss below. Rather than parsing out this summary to each of the four scales 
considered, each is discussed simultaneously, with an emphasis on the results of the 
final, fully specified model. Due to space considerations, we focus our discussion on-
ly on those predictors that were significant in this final iteration.   
 
Results 
In the first set of controls, which included the geographic and demographic 
measures associated with individual respondents, age is the most consistently signifi-
cant explanatory factor. A one-category increase in age—respondents were grouped 
into six age classes—leads to an associated increase in attachment at all four territori-
al scales. Age is significant across all four final models, though the results for attach-
ment to the national scale are most notable; an incremental increase in the age catego-
ry is associated with a fifteen percent rise in attachment. This suggests that young re-
spondents are significantly less likely to feel attached to the territories considered in 
comparison to older generations. Importantly, this result challenges the pre-existing 
literature that suggests a negative relationship between age and European identity and 
support (Janssen, 1991; Gabel, 1998b). Younger respondents are less likely to indicate 
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attachment across all four scales, showing a sort of indifference to traditional political 
territories/boundaries, Europe included. It might also be that young people have a 
more cosmopolitan view of the world that even the idea of Europe fails to capture, or 
that inclusion in the geographic contexts considered increases as individuals age (see 
Schueth and O’Loughlin, 2008).12 
With respect to gender, males are significantly less likely to indicate attachment 
to the national territory. The results for the other scales are inconclusive; as such, we 
are unable to confirm the “gender gap” reported in other studies (Nelsen and Guth, 
2000), which find that women report lower levels of support for a pan-European polit-
ical project in comparison to men. 
Education plays an ambiguous role in estimating attachment across the four 
scales, although this uncertainly mirrors what other authors have observed in the case 
of support for the European Union (Inglehart, 1977; Janssen, 1991; Deflem and Pam-
pel, 1996; Gabel, 1998a; Carey, 2002). With regard to local, regional and national 
scales, as education increases, reported attachment decreases; these results are signifi-
cantly at the 0.001 level for the local and the regional, and to the 0.01 level for the 
national. The opposite is generally true for European attachment, though the variable 
is not significant in the final model. Employment status and the rural/urban character 
of the place of residence of respondents generally have little effect on territorial at-
tachment; only in the case of attachment to Europe are those currently not working 
significantly more likely to indicate attachment. 
Among the controls which measure personal values and attitudes, the im-
portance given to family proved significant in all the four models; those who identi-
fied the family as an important component of their life were significantly more likely 
(at the 0.001 level) to indicate attachment to each of the four scales. This might mean 
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that people who espouse traditional values—as represented by the importance given 
to family—are more likely to feel attached to territory (at any scale, Europe included) 
than others. Attachment to the region and nation is associated with the highest likeli-
hood, with respondents roughly 50 percent more likely to indicate attachment. 
Willingness to learn foreign languages is also significant in three of the four 
models, being inversely associated with local, regional, and national attachment, but 
directly related to European attachment (it is not significant for national attachment). 
This confirms the original expectation; people who want to learn a foreign language 
are more ‘open’ than others and as such their likelihood to feel attached to traditional 
‘containers’ (locality, region, and nation-state) is lower than others. The likelihood of 
attachment to Europe is higher for those interested in learning a foreign language in 
comparison to the remainder of the population. 
Individual expectations as associated with a respondent’s personal life are only 
significant in the model evaluating local attachment; those who expect a worsening of 
their situation are more likely to indicate attachment to their locality. The independent 
variable measuring expectations regarding the economy of the country in which one 
lives is significant for the local and European scales; those with a positive economic 
outlook are, interestingly, more likely to indicate attachment to the locality and the 
European Union. A “feeling good” factor is therefore an important dimension to ex-
plain territorial attachment. The variable for political interest confirms Inglehart’s 
cognitive theory, which argues that higher level of cognitive mobilization (as here 
epitomized by the degree to which a person talks of political issues) leads to a higher 
cosmopolitan attitude and therefore a more positive attitude towards Europe.  
National pride and European pride both play important roles in explaining terri-
torial attachment. Though the close relationship between pride and attachment to the 
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nation and Europe is unsurprising, the inclusion of the pride variables results in nota-
ble outcomes for attachment to the more parochial scales. People who are either very 
or fairly proud of their nation are significantly more likely (at the 0.001 level) to feel 
an attachment to their locality and region, by a factor of 2.5. For European attach-
ment, and in support of the findings of Carey (2002), individuals with higher reported 
national pride are significantly less likely to report attachment to Europe. Interesting-
ly, when attachment is evaluated with respect to European pride, those respondents 
who are either very or fairly proud of being European are significantly more likely to 
indicate attachment to the region, nation, and Europe. This result seems to suggest 
that while the nation tends to be a more exclusive identifier, Europe stands instead for 
a more open identity marker, capable of coexisting with other identity dimensions 
more than the nation. 
In the final models, the self-ascribed position on the political spectrum (right, 
centre, left) does not play a significant role in explaining territorial attachment. This 
result was not expected in relation to European attachment, since previous studies 
(Inglehart et al. 1991; Franklin et al. 1994; Gabel 1998b) have demonstrated the im-
portance of political partisanship. Upon deeper reflection, this ambivalence is ex-
plainable by the fact that different political parties, occupying different positions on 
the political spectrum, voice concerns over European integration depending on the 
country; Taylor (2008), for example, suggests that anti-expansion rhetoric was more 
likely to be found on the political fringes in France in comparison to Great Britain. 
Less ambiguously, those who report an interest in politics are more likely to report 
attachment to the European Union. 
The regional contextual variables provide the most interesting results from the 
modelling, and distinguish this study from previous work on attachment that has not 
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incorporated a multi-level approach. First, in wealthy regions respondents were signif-
icantly less likely to indicate attachment to the local and regional scales and more 
likely to report attachment to Europe. At the same time, respondents in those regions 
where GDP is growing were more likely to report attachment to the locality, the re-
gion or the nation. This is an interesting finding, which suggests that high levels of 
economic development result in increased attachment to Europe, while in fast-
growing areas attachment to the locality, region, and nation all remain strong, with 
these scales serving as a marker of political identity that, potentially, becomes less 
important as high living standards are consolidated.   
Second, respondents residing in regions with lower unemployment rates indicate 
higher levels of attachment to all four scales under consideration (though the variable 
is not significant for the national scale). Though this result somewhat contradicts the 
findings for the individual variable—where those currently not working (including the 
unemployed, students and pensioners) indicated stronger attachment to Europe 
alone—the finding potentially indicates that those living in economically vibrant areas 
are more likely to hold an attachment to a variety of territories.   
Lastly, the population density of a respondent’s region is only significant for at-
tachment to the locality (at the 0.05 level). There is, perhaps, an expectation that those 
living in more urbanized areas would indicate a weaker attachment to the local and 
regional scales, and higher levels of identification with Europe. For the locality the 
opposite appears to be true, indicating that those living in more densely populated ar-
eas view it as an important touchstone to which they desire to maintain some attach-
ment.     
 
5. Conclusion 
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After evaluating Eurobarometer survey data for territorial attachment, it is cur-
rently difficult to accept Urry’s (2000) prediction for the 21st century—that a new so-
cial order of flows would replace the existing social order based on territory. Territo-
rial identities are still relevant, at least in Western Europe. This does not mean that 
new spaces of flows, mobility and trans-territoriality do not already exist. Based on 
the above results, it seems plausible though to affirm that these new “spaces of flows” 
have not substituted the traditional “spaces of place” – to use Castells’ (2000) termi-
nology. The link between individuals and territory does not show any sign of losing 
momentum. Rather than an “either/or” logic, it is perhaps more realistic to think of 
identity formation in terms of a “both/and” logic, much in the way many Europeans 
simultaneously evoke their national and European identities. 
If territory remains a central dimension in the social articulation of the Self, it is 
legitimate to ask whether notions of territorial attachment have changed over time. By 
relying on longitudinal Eurobarometer survey data collected around four scales (local, 
regional, national, and European), we found no evidence of a territorial re-scaling in 
the case of Western Europe. Attachment to the nation continues to remain primary, 
followed closely by local and regional attachments which, throughout the period ana-
lyzed, frequently overlap. European attachment has increased over the study period, 
but, after a phase of instability associated with the introduction of the Euro, has lev-
elled off at 60-70%. Whether European attachment will remain at this level or will 
change, particularly in time of economic and financial crisis, remains a matter of 
speculation. 
This lack of territorial re-scaling might be interpreted in two ways – either col-
lective identity formation and the processes associated with the post-Fordist transition 
do not influence each other or the re-scaling is underway, but still to manifest. Alter-
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natively, we can also hypothesize that our instruments are insufficient to capture this 
phenomenon. 
With respect to the factors that explain territorial attachment at multiple scales, a 
topic largely under investigated by the literature, our statistical model suggests that 
both personal compositional and regional contextual factors are significant. Geo-
demographic characteristics (education and age, but also gender and place of resi-
dence for particular scales) and personal values and attitudes (the importance of fami-
ly, willingness to learn a foreign language, and national pride, in particular) are the 
consistently significant variables throughout the four models. Clearly, it is impossible 
to identify a single determinant from this class of variables that serves to explain terri-
torial attachment. Instead, such sentiment is the product of a variety of factors, some 
of which relate to objective features of the individual and some to other personal fea-
tures, which are commonly held among individuals, regardless of their level of social 
standing or background. 
The regional contextual variables, including GDP growth, GDP per capita, and 
unemployment, are significant is certain models. For example, respondents living in 
wealthy regions are more likely to report attachment to Europe, while those in poorer 
regions are more likely to indicate attachment to the parochial scales: locality and the 
region. But GDP growth could, in time, erode this attachment to the parochial. Those 
respondents in regions that have benefited from the post-Fordist economy—with low 
unemployment rates and high rates of employment in technology jobs—are more like-
ly to indicate attachment to Europe; if the benefits of the post-Fordist economy 
spread, perhaps this connection to Europe as a territory will grow as well. This is an 
important finding, which points to the direction that some identity re-scaling might 
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indeed be associated with the switch to the new modes of global production – some-
thing which our descriptive statistics could not capture. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 2: Logit model for territorial attachment to the local scale (Odds ratios reported) 
 
Independent variables  Individual variable entry   Fully specified model 
Geo-demographic   
   Males 0.89* 1.01 
   Age 1.19*** 1.07* 
   Education 0.63*** 0.71*** 
   Employment status 0.96 1.06 
   Place of residence 0.99  1.04 
Personal Values and Atti-
tudes 
  
   Personal expectation 0.84***  0.87* 
   Economic expectation 1.12**  1.16** 
   Importance of family 1.83***  1.43*** 
   Willingness to learn a      
      foreign language 
0.47***  0.66*** 
   National pride 3.22***  2.63*** 
   European pride  1.43***  1.07 
   Political interest 0.86***  1.02 
   Political preference 0.90  0.95 
Contextual   
   GDP per capita (PPP) 0.99***  0.99*** 
   GDP growth 1.19***  1.17*** 
   Unemployment rate 1.05***  1.04*** 
   Employment in high-     
      tech sectors 
0.96***  1.00 
   Population density 0.99***  1.00* 
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Observations in model  8,449 
R-squared  0.074 
Significance levels are indicated by asterisks: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Logit model for territorial attachment to the regional scale (Odds ratios re-
ported) 
 
Independent variables  Individual variable entry   Fully specified model 
Geo-demographic   
   Males 0.90 0.92  
   Age 1.22*** 1.11***  
   Education 0.64*** 0.71*** 
   Employment status 0.88* 0.92 
   Place of residence 0.84*** 0.88 
Personal Values and Atti-
tudes 
    
   Personal expectation 0.88**  0.96  
   Economic expectation 1.06 1.06 
   Importance of family 1.92***  1.53*** 
   Willingness to learn a      
      foreign language 
0.52***  0.83*  
   National pride 3.56***  2.64***  
   European pride  1.51***  1.21*  
   Political interest 0.88**  1.07  
   Political preference 0.89  1.01  
Contextual     
   GDP per capita (PPP) 0.99*** 0.99***  
   GDP growth 1.20*** 1.17*** 
   Unemployment rate 1.04*** 1.03**  
   Employment in high-     
      tech sectors 
0.96*** 1.01  
   Population density 0.99*** 1.00  
    
Observations in model  8440  
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R-squared  0.074 
Significance levels are indicated by asterisks: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Logit model for territorial attachment to the national scale (Odds ratios re-
ported) 
 
Independent variables  Individual variable entry   Fully specified model 
Geo-demographic   
   Males 0.85* 0.83*  
   Age 1.22*** 1.15***  
   Education 0.68***  0.81**  
   Employment status 0.96  1.01  
   Place of residence 0.89** 0.96 
Personal Values and Atti-
tudes 
    
   Personal expectation 0.94  0.88  
   Economic expectation 1.19*** 1.07 
   Importance of family 2.03***  1.53***  
   Willingness to learn a      
      foreign language 
0.59***  0.89  
   National pride 9.94***  7.51***  
   European pride  2.64***  1.37**  
   Political interest 0.85***  1.06  
   Political preference 0.76***  0.84  
Contextual     
   GDP per capita (PPP) 0.99***  0.99  
   GDP growth 1.21*** 1.13*** 
   Unemployment rate 1.01 1.01  
   Employment in high-     
      tech sectors 
0.95*** 0.99  
   Population density 0.99***                                                   0.99  
    
Observations in model  8446  
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R-squared  0.153 
Significance levels are indicated by asterisks: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Logit model for territorial attachment to the European Union (Odds ratios 
reported) 
 
Independent variables  Individual variable entry   Fully specified model 
Geo-demographic   
   Males 1.14***  1.11  
   Age 0.97** 1.06**  
   Education 1.27***  1.07  
   Employment status 1.01  0.86*  
   Place of residence 1.02 0.96 
Personal Values and Atti-
tudes 
    
   Personal expectation 1.29***  0.99  
   Economic expectation 1.37*** 1.21*** 
   Importance of family 1.11*  1.31*** 
   Willingness to learn a      
      foreign language 
1.73***  1.33***  
   National pride 1.86***  0.62***  
   European pride  9.80***  11.03***  
   Political interest 1.42***  1.31***  
   Political preference 1.01  0.98  
Contextual     
   GDP per capita (PPP) 1.00***  1.00***  
   GDP growth 0.99 0.96* 
   Unemployment rate 1.02*** 1.06***  
   Employment in high-     
      tech sectors 
1.00 1.01  
   Population density 1.00 0.99  
    
Observations in model  8384  
R-squared  0.200 
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Significance levels are indicated by asterisks: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Territorial attachment in EU-15 (‘very’ + ‘fairly’), 1991-2007. 
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 Source: Eurobarometer (1991-2007). 
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Figure 2. Geographical belonging (‘1st’ + ‘2nd’ choice). Aggregated mean values for 
the following countries: France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Sweden, and Ireland. 
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Table 1 Correlation coefficients for territorial attachment 
 
 
 Local Regional National 
1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 
Local 1.000 1.000 - - - - 
Regional .601 
 
.665 
 
1.000 1.000 - 
 
- 
 
National .363 .449 
 
.396 
 
.503 
 
1.000 1.000 
European .087 
 
.142 
 
.090 
 
.190 
 
.160 
 
.281 
 
 
Source: Eb 43.1bis (1995); Eb 67.1 (2007) 
All values are significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
 
                                                 
1
 Though we considered alternative data sets (European Values Study and International Social Survey 
Programme), since the primary goal of the present research is to answer a question about the re-scaling 
of territorial identities, the extensive longitudinal character of a survey series is of fundamental im-
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portance. By offering the longest time coverage for the whole region under investigation, Standard Eu-
robarometer surveys remain therefore the most suitable data sets. 
 
2
 The following Standard Eurobarometer surveys have been used for the present analysis: EB 36 
(1991), EB 43.1 bis (1995), EB 51.0 (1999), EB 54.1 (2000), EB 56.3 (2002), EB 60.1 (2003), EB 62.0 
(2004), EB 63.4 (2005), EB 65.2 (2006), and EB 67.1 (2007). It should be noted that for EB 36, EB 
43.1 bis, and EB 65.2 the question was split in two: “the European Union” and “Europe [as a whole]”.  
In both cases, data about “Europe [as a whole]” were used. In the case of EB 67.1, a fifth item (“at-
tachment to the world”) was introduced. Although the first time a question about territorial attachment 
was asked in Eurobarometer surveys was in 1971 (ECS 71), its different phrasing (“To which of these 
areas do you feel you belong most strongly? And which next? City/locality, department, region, coun-
try, Europe, other”) prevents its use in the present study. A similar consideration applies also to EB 
50.1 (1998), whose question was formulated in the same way as in the 1971 survey and as such it was 
not used in the present study. A similar wording issue characterizes also the most recent EB survey 
available on territorial attachment (EB73.3, 2010), which dropped ‘Europe’ in favour of ‘European 
Union’. This is the reason why our analysis stops at the year 2007. 
 
3
 Given the cross-national character of the EB survey, it is certainly possible that the same geographical 
unit might be associated with different meanings in different countries. This might be a potential issue 
in particular for ‘region’ - a geographically rather ambiguous term (Antonsich, 2010b) – which, in 
some cases (e.g. Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, etc.) might be confounded by respondents with ‘country’. 
However, among the possible answers, the EB questionnaire does not list ‘our country’, but the name 
of the country of residence of the respondent (e.g., ‘Spain’, ‘France’, ‘Italy’). This obviously excludes 
any possible confusion between ‘region’ and ‘country’. 
 
4
 We decided to use EB 43.1bis (1995) rather than the oldest Eurobarometer data set available for this 
series (EB 36 – 1991), since the former includes also Finland, Sweden and Austria. 
 
5
 As pointed out by one anonymous reviewer, we should acknowledge that positive correlations could 
also result from subjective differences in how the scale is understood, since attachment means different 
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things in different contexts.  While this is true, it is however difficult to accurately gauge, given the 
cross-cultural nature of the Eurobarometer survey; instead, we accept the survey as worded and rely on 
the result as reported. 
 
6
 Among all the Western European countries surveyed by EVS, only eight have been present in all the 
four waves: France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and Ire-
land. 
 
7
 The European Communities Study (ECS) administered in 1971 adopted a questionnaire similar to the 
one used in the EVS, but unfortunately split the regional answer in two categories (‘department’ and 
‘province’) making difficult to compare the data. 
 
8
 The focus on EB 60.1 rather than on more recent Eurobarometer data sets is due to the fact that at the 
time this study was carried out Eurostat data for European regions were not yet available for more re-
cent years. Eurostat statistical data can be retrieved free of charge from their official website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat. 
 
9
 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) are the statistical units used by Eurostat, the 
official statistical institute of the European Union. NUTS are classified into 3 levels. In general, level 1 
corresponds to provinces or counties, level 2 to administrative regions and level 3 to macro-regions 
within each member-state of the EU. NUTS 2 correspond to the geographical scale at which Euroba-
rometer survey data were collected. 
 
10
 In these two cases, to use data for the year 2003 only is not inconsistent in relation to the other geo-
graphical contextual variables – for which the average over the years 2001-2003 was used. It seems in 
fact legitimate to assume that both population density and higher education percentage are more stable 
over time than economic and labour data. 
 
11
 Inglehart’s theory about changing political attitudes in Western Europe revolves around two major 
concepts: post-materialism (giving priority to symbolic, as opposed to material, objects) and cognitive 
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mobilization (the capacity for processing information at certain levels of abstraction). However, more 
recent quantitative studies have suggested that both post-materialism (Janssen 1991) and cognitive mo-
bilization (Gabel 1998a) do not play a significant role in influencing public support for the European 
Union. 
 
12
 Again, we are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this second suggestion.   
